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Abstract
Collective memory and identity so often go hand in hand with conflicts. Alongside the use of violence, conflicts unfold against the backdrop
of different narratives about the past through which groups constantly remind themselves of the supposed origin of the conflict, and
consequently, what position individuals are expected to take as members of the group. Narratives – as symbolic tools for interpreting the
past and the present, as well as happenings that have yet to occur – simultaneously underpin, and are underpinned by, the position held by
each warring faction. Drawing on previous works, this paper compares different versions of the 2016 truce period in the Basque Country
stemming from three subjects identified, to varying degrees, with the main political actors involved in that conflict. These three cases have
been selected from a total of 16 participants who were asked to define the Basque conflict and to provide an account of the 2006 truce
period by using 23 documents taken from different Spanish newspapers. On the one hand, the results show two narratives reproducing the
versions of two of the main political actors involved in the conflict, and on the other hand, a narrative characterized by a more personal and
ironic appropriation of those versions. Results are discussed vis-à-vis the use of irony in history teaching in increasingly plural societies.
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Identity and memory are virtually inseparable concepts. On the one hand, it is a known fact that memory,
understood as being the reconstruction of the past, is a deciding factor in respect of both individual and
collective identity. According to certain authors closely associated with the narrative turn that took place in the
Human Sciences (Polkinghorne, 1988), the existence of a narrative is crucial in that it relates the past to the
present on the basis of the same entity involved in the account, thus enabling us to believe in the permanence
of that same entity throughout time, be it self (Ricoeur, 1991) or an imagined community such as nations
(Anderson, 1983). On the other hand, we are also aware, from the pioneering work of Halbwachs (1950/1980)
and Bartlett (1932), that the way in which we remember our past is strongly influenced by the groups in which
we live and by which we identify ourselves. Memory is social from the outset, insofar as groups provide us with
both symbolic resources – language or narrative structures (Wertsch, 2002) – and motifs for constructing and
sharing our memories. Furthermore, since infancy we are exposed to a constant barrage of accounts of the
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past, whether in informal contexts such as family or formal contexts such as school. These are narratives
which, despite occurring prior to our own existence, end up forming part of our past and therefore our identity.
We can thus say that our personal identity is irredeemably linked to collective identity, since by appropriating
the group’s past accounts, we become emotionally involved in them and absorb the values, achievements,
grievances and collective claims conveyed by those accounts. In fact, this socially shared sense of the past is
what often leads us to identify with the positions defended by individuals who claim to represent certain groups
or collectives, and to assume them as our own, in the first person plural. This way of transmitting the past and
making it available and familiar to individuals has led some authors (Bar-Tal, 2014; Liu & Hilton, 2005) to study
collective memory through the social representations theory (Moscovici, 1984). From this perspective, memory
is considered as something dynamic, “actively engaged, socially and materially situated, reconstructive and
oriented to the future” (Wagoner, 2015, p. 143). This dynamic implies, on the one hand, a process of
objectification, by which the group’s historical past is conveyed through a range of stories, images, rituals,
monuments etc., and on the other hand, a process of anchoring, whereby the group’s representation of the past
becomes a framework against which to interpret the present and imagine the future.
Collective memory and identity so often go hand in hand with conflicts to the point that they seamlessly feed
into each other. Thus, on one hand, conflicts deeply mark groups’ collective memory and identity, whether in
the form of deeds to be collectively remembered and celebrated or grievances and affronts not to be forgotten.
On the other hand, memory and identity are elements that underlie many conflicts, insofar as certain ways of
enhancing a common sense of belonging are built upon groups’ old – or recent – scars, grievances,
resentments and hatreds, thus providing a rationale through which conflicts may be fuelled, reignited and
perpetuated. In this sense, alongside the use of violence, conflicts unfold against the backdrop of different
narratives about the past through which groups constantly remind themselves of the supposed origin of the
conflict, and consequently, what position individuals are expected to take as members of the group. Thus,
narratives – as symbolic tools for interpreting the past and the present, as well as happenings that have yet to
occur – simultaneously underpin, and are underpinned by, the position held by each warring faction (see Harré
& van Langenhove, 1999). This gives rise to a symbolic and argumentative context (Brescó & Wagoner, 2016)
saturated by different partisan narratives, these in turn being the symbolic tools or mediational means (Wertsch,
1991) by which people come to give sense to conflicts and build a position according to the group with which
they identify.
In such divided and multivoiced contexts, the possible standpoints on the conflict are pretty much constrained
by warring factions’ discourses and voices, which individuals – identified with different groups – tend to
appropriate and make their own. This would explain why in conflicts deemed as intractable (Bar-Tal, 2013) –
where groups are somehow locked in their own positions and versions of the conflict (see Nicholson, 2016) –
new favourable scenarios for reconciliation are usually perceived and anchored in light of the old narratives and
ways of representing the conflict. In such cases, in which a window for peace seems to emerge, alternative
approaches tend to be overshadowed by partisan ways of interpreting reality.
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Identity, Memory, and Conflict in the Basque Country
The Basque Country conflict in Spain – now on the way to be resolved – is a clear example of thisi. After fifty
years of violence and social unrest, the armed group ETA (acronym for Euzkadi ta Azcatasuna or Basque
Country and Freedom in English) announced a permanent ceasefire in March 2006. This announcement was
surrounded by controversy since the very beginning due to the different ways in which the ceasefire was
interpreted by the main political actors involved in the conflict. ETA considered the ceasefire as the first step to
negotiate the independence of the Basque Country from the Spanish State. The Spanish Government (headed
at that time by the Socialist José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero) deemed the ceasefire as an opportunity to initiate a
peace process which could lead to a negotiated solution to the conflict. By its part, the main opposition party
(the right wing People’s Party) considered the ceasefire as a “truce-trap” and accused the Government of
having secret deals with the terrorists and surrendering the country to ETA. In December that year, ETA planted
a bomb at Madrid airport, leaving two people dead. That attack – justified by ETA as a response to the
Government’s passivity during the truce period – was the tragic outcome of nine months of political unrest
during which the main actors involved resorted to different accounts in order to justify their own positions vis-à-
vis a process understood as a “democratic process” according to Batasuna, a “peace process” from the
Government’s point of view and a “trick process” by the People’s Party.
Thus, following the bombing attack at Madrid airport, diverse ways of understanding that process were
consolidated by means of various opposing accounts; accounts that also acted as tools by which people could
interpret, recall and draw conclusions from the ceasefire according to their identification with the main figures
involved. This is not to say that agency was vanished amidst warring factions’ narratives and voices. Agency
lays on the irreducible tension between those meditational means provided by a particular socio-cultural setting
– in this case, the public narratives about the ceasefire period – and the way these are used by individuals as a
resource in remembering (Wertsch, 2002). In Bakhtinian terms this implies different forms of multivoiced
authoring (Bakhtin, 1981; see also Wertsch & O’Connor, 1994) in that different voices (in this case, those
pertaining to the main figures involved in the conflict) would be appropriated and adapted to individuals’ own
intentions in different specific contexts. Such a personal appropriation of social discourses may take different
degrees of agency and authorship, ranging from reproduction and acceptance, at one end of the continuum, to
entire rejection on the other (Brescó, 2016; Wertsch & O’Connor, 1994). However, in polarised contexts
saturated with partisan discourses, it is often the case that the rejection of one implies embracing some other. It
is in these particular contexts – such as the Basque conflict – where personal appropriation of these discourses
in the form of irony or satire becomes a way of resisting – and mocking – the warring factions’ militant
discourses saturating the public sphere.
Case Study: Remembering the 2006 Truce Period in the Basque Country
Drawing on previous works (Brescó, 2009, 2016), this section aims to compare different versions of the
abovementioned truce period stemming from three subjects identified to varying extents with the main political
actors involved in that Basque conflictii. These three cases form part of a wider study in which a total of 16
undergraduate students – from the University of the Basque Country and the Autonomous University of Madrid
– were asked to define the Basque conflict and to provide an account of the 2006 ceasefire period by using 23
short documents extracted from TV and different Spanish newspapersiii. The documents used for this study –
arranged in chronological order – consisted of five pictures, ten broadsheet headings and eight brief extracts of
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statements delivered by some political actors during the truce period (see examples of each type in Table 1).
Participants were allowed to use the documents in any way they wished (e.g., only using those supporting their
views on the truce period, omitting those others they deemed unimportant or at odds with their viewpoints, and
adding whatever extra information they considered appropriate).
Table 1
Examples of the Different Type of Documents Provided to Participants
Type of document Example
Broadsheet heading “More detentions, reports of torture and prohibitions of Batasuna’s demonstrations” (Gara, pro
Batasuna newspaper)
“ETA steals 300 guns with large amounts of ammunition in the southeast of France” (ABC, right-wing
newspaper)
Political statement “The People’s Party’s cooperation is key to achieving the end of violence” (Spanish Prime Minister José
Luís Rodríguez Zapatero)
“Pretty soon the government will go back to its bad ways and will negotiate with ETA again” (Ángel
Acebes, People’s Party member)
Picture
Members of ETA announcing the cease-fire (El País, centre-left wing newspaper)
Analysis of the accounts on the peace process yielded by participants focused on how their respective
thematization and positioning vis-à-vis the conflict mediated the way this event was reconstructed – viz, which
documents were used or ignored by each participant and what meaning and function these documents
acquired within each account. Of particular interest here is showing how these three subjects appropriate and
use different narratives of the truce period in light of their respective identification with the main figures
involved. Along these lines, results include, on the one hand, two versions reproducing the story-line provided
by two of these figuresiv, and on the other and, a version characterized by a more personal, critical and ironic
appropriation of these narratives.
Participant 1: Greenv is an 18-year-old male who studies psychology at the University of the Basque
Country and who identifies with Batasuna. The following is Green’s definition of the Basque conflict and
his account of the ceasefire period:
Definition of the Basque conflict: “It is a conflict between an oppressed nation and two oppressor states
(Spain and France) which refuse to recognize the right all democratic states have: the right to self-
determination. This situation has led to an armed conflict.”
Account of the ceasefire period: “ETA declares a truce and ceases all its actions. The Government
says that it is willing to meet with ETA. Batasuna expresses its willingness to negotiate the future of the
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Basque Country. The Spanish state keeps imprisoning, torturing and oppressing the Basque People,
especially Batasuna and its supporters. Given the course of events and the Government’s inability to
move forward, ETA decides to send out a warning to the Government by planting a bomb at Madrid
airport. The Government doesn’t react and the truce comes to an end. Then, ETA returns to its armed
struggle.”
Green clearly takes Batasuna’s position and makes it his own, thus defining the conflict as one caused by the
oppression of the Basque People by both the Spanish and French state. Building up on such position, the
participant justifies and delegitimizes the actions of the main figures involved in the ceasefire period. According
to Green’s version, despite ETA’s good intentions, the Spanish Government failed in its democratic duty by not
listening to the Basque people, thereby causing ETA to exercise its right to resume the armed struggle. It is
also worth noting that in order to support this version, the participant omitted all documents (included among
the material handed out to the subjects) referring to ETA’s violent activities during the ceasefire, and instead
used the news article from Gara – a newspaper with close ties to Batasuna – which spoke of arrests and torture
vis-à-vis Batasuna and its supporters. Here, it is the Government that is responsible for the truce’s failure by not
responding to ETA’s warning in the form of a bomb attack, this being conceived as a form of communication.
Participant 2: Blue is an 18-year-old female who studies psychology in Madrid and sympathizes with
the right-wing People’s Party. She sees the conflict and the ceasefire period as follows:
Definition of the Basque conflict: “There is a group of people from that region who don’t feel Spanish so
they use violence.”
Account of the ceasefire period: “Thanks to a series of secret agreements between ETA and the
Socialist Party, with many concessions made by the latter, a truce was achieved. During the supposed
truce period, the Government was completely willing to hold talks with the terrorists while they kept on
committing terrorist acts. Thousands of Spaniards marched, demanding that Zapatero stop yielding to
ETA’s claims. In turn, the People’s Party split with the Government due to Zapatero’s erroneous
strategy. This event ended with the terrorist attack on Madrid Airport, which caused two casualties (this
is, in fact, the only way ETA understands dialogue). After this attack, we are still supposed to believe
that the Government has dropped negotiations with ETA.”
Blue considers the violence employed by a supposed anti-Spanish faction as being the origin of the Basque
conflict, thus somehow assuming a connection between not feeling Spanish and the use of violence. In
analysing Blue’s version, we can see how this participant takes People’s Party stance on the truce period and
makes it her own. In accordance to that, Blue tends to use those newspapers closer to that party (see endnote
iii). Thus, unlike Green’s version, she assesses the truce in quite a negative light, considering it as a “plot”
between the Socialist Government and ETA, pretty much in line with those right-wing newspapers and
politicians who supported the conspiracy theory along the peace process. For example, Blue’s words echo the
statement by a People’s Party member – included in the material – whereby ETA’s ceasefire announcement
was linked to Zapatero’s supposed previous concessions to that group. Along these lines, Blue’s account refers
to one of the pictures provided featuring numerous people demonstrating against government’s peace-making
process. Blue also includes in her account some of the news referred to some of the alleged ETA’s terrorist
activities during the truce period. Additionally, Blue explicitly refers to the terrorist attack and the two resulting
casualties – an attacked depicted in one of the pictures provided to the participants. Interestingly enough, her
remark on this tragic outcome – which she describes as ETA’s only way of understanding dialogue – echoes
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Green’s version in which the attack was conceived as a form of communication, in this case as a mere warning.
All in all, Blue´s version of the events would prove the uselessness of dialogue with the terrorists in line with the
People’s Party position against the government’s attempt to reach a peace agreement with ETA. In light of this,
the position taken by the People’s Party throughout the peace process is no longer a failure, but a patriotic duty
against a preceding immoral agreement.
Participant 3: Gray is a 23-year-old male who studies psychology in Madrid. He sympathises with the
Socialist Party and Izquierda Unida (United Left), a party to the left of the former which also supported
the peace-making process. Gray’s view on both the conflict and the truce period is as follows:
Definition of the Basque conflict: “This is a somewhat fictitious conflict. I don’t think that it’s about the
Basque people’s claim for independence, or at least, it’s not just about that. I believe that both sides
feed off each other’s positions and live off keeping the conflict alive to some extent.”
Account of the ceasefire period: “On the 22nd of March three gentlemen wearing hoods and fancy dress
appear on TV announcing a truce. They pledge not to kill for a certain period of time whereas the
Government undertakes nobody knows what. Everybody is very happy about what is deemed the
beginning of a peace process and because the end of violence is thought to be near. Immediately
afterwards, all the political and media machinery is set in motion. The politicians start to calculate every
move in terms of electioneering benefits. On the one hand, the People’s Party, in order to discredit the
Socialists, insinuates that ETA’s and the Government’s interests are basically the same. On the other
hand, the Socialist Party does everything in its power to prevent the process from getting out of hand,
trying to please everybody with promises. As for the Basque extreme nationalists, they try to appear as
the champions of peace in order to obtain greater support among the people and thus reinforce their
presence in the institutions. The constant attacks and innuendos launched by the People’s Party end
up undermining Zapatero’s popularity, thus leading the Government to adopt a tougher line against
ETA. At the same time, the members of ETA who are not interested in giving up the struggle manage to
impose their strategy which finally results in the bomb attack at Madrid airport. With this tragic episode,
both the peace process and the cheap farce set up around it come to an end”.
Gray’s stance is removed from the position of the main political actors as he sees the conflict as something
fictitious, fuelled by the actors themselves. From this standpoint, the claims deriving from each actor’s position
become meaningless insofar as they would constitute a resource for nourishing a conflict that all sides wish to
keep alight. Such a critical distance is reflected in the way the truce period is narrated. Thus, from the very first
sentence (On the 22nd of March three gentlemen wearing hoods and fancy dress appear on TV announcing a
truce), Gray makes clear his resistance to take seriously what the actors involved in the truce period claim to be
doing. This ironic stance on what is considered a fictitious conflict is further reinforced by his explicitly likening
the peace-process to a “cheap farce”. Along these lines, the whole episode is narrated as if it were a play, one
that starts off with the appearance on the stage (in this case, on television) of the three members of ETA
announcing the ceasefire and the activation of all the political and media machinery, which continues to operate
until the bombing attack on Madrid airport. This way of reconstructing the ceasefire period moreover
underscores the fictitious nature of the position of the actors involved, actors whose ‘performance’ is aimed
more at making their respective audiences happy – i.e., not losing popularity among their voters and supporters
– than at having their claims satisfied – be it achieving independence, reaching an agreement through dialogue
or defending the unity of the Spanish state.
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Militant Voices and Militant Irony in the Basque Conflict
As we can see in these three examples, participants Green and Blue clearly identify themselves with certain
political actors (ETA and the People’s Party, respectively), thus assuming and to some extent reproducing their
corresponding versions of the truce period, including the claims, criticisms and justifications contained in such
versions. As a result, we have two militant accounts in which each participant seems to accept and adopt the
voice of one of those actors and make it their own. From a Bakhtinian perspective, we could say that the actors’
voices speak through the participants’ accounts, or in other words, that participants have been to some degree
talked—or ventriloquized—by those actors’ voices.
Contrary to Green’s and Blue’s acceptance of such voices, Gray’s critical stance on both ETA and People’s
Party positions is reflected through an ironic, even satirical, narrative style by which this participant criticises the
absurd logic that characterises these actors’ conduct and by extension the whole conflict at large. This is
carried out by means of a certain way of using the voices of the political actors themselves in order to highlight
their absurdity during the truce period. This resource, linked to irony, is close to the Bakhtinian concept of
‘double-voicedness’, “refer[ed] to the use of someone else’s words in order to express one’s own intentions and
meanings that are hostile to others’ words” (Marková, 2003, p. 63). We can see examples of this at the
beginning of Gray’s account, when he speaks ironically about both ETA’s ceasefire (“they pledge not to kill for a
certain period of time whereas the Government undertakes nobody knows what”) and the general optimism and
faith in relation to the truce and the end of the conflict (“everybody is very happy about what is deemed the
beginning of a peace process and because the end of violence is thought to be near”).
In Gray´s case, we find a greater degree of agency in reconstructing the truce period compared to the cases of
Green and Blue. Thus, whereas in the latter cases the participants’ words expressed the view of the main
political actors on the truce period, in Gray’s case the words of those political actors are used to express the
participant’s more personal view of it. In this regard, Gray’s satirical and distant stance is not incompatible with
the adoption of his own positioning on the episode in question. As Frye (1957) points out in his work on Tropics
of Discourse, “satire is militant irony: its moral norms are relatively clear, and it assumes standards against
which the grotesque and absurd are measured” (p. 223). This moral dimension related to the use of tropes and
genres is further developed by the philosopher of history Hayden White who argues that the narrative forms
used in reconstructing the past inevitably convey a moral content (White, 1986). In the particular case of irony,
this author considers this genre as a meta-trope, a trope related to self-consciousness in the use of language
when talking about the past. In White’s own words, “[irony] represents a stage of consciousness in which the
problematical nature of language itself has become recognized” (White, 1973, p. 37).
Memory, Identity and History Teaching: Towards an Ironic
Citizenship?
Identity and memory are elements that can easily be found in many conflicts. Groups transmit and use
narratives about the past in order to underpin their identity as well as their respective position within conflicts.
These narratives act as mediational tools through which the members of the group not only reconstruct the past
– viz., how the conflict originated – but also anchor and give meaning to present events as well as the conflict’s
future horizon. Transmission of these narratives takes place in different contexts, such as the family and school.
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As for the latter, according to Carretero (2011), history teaching continues to focus on “intimate emotional
adherence to national identity symbols and narratives – in detriment to critical thinking” (p. 38). According to
Misztal (2003), this identity-based conveyance of historical narratives serves to both legitimize certain political
structures and claim historically marginalized identities. In both cases, the objective lies in instilling loyalty
towards the different collectives, leading individuals to assume as their own the collectives’ past and future,
their defeats and victories, their heroes and enemies. As Liu and Hilton (2005) state, social representations of
the past have a mobilizing power as they outline a trajectory telling “us who we are, where we came from and
where we should be going” (p. 537).
This leads us to highlight the role of imagination, or more specifically the politics of imagination (Bottici &
Challand, 2011), both regarding collective identity – how our identity is imagined in opposition to a certain
alterity (see Glăveanu & de Saint Laurent, 2015) – and collective memory – how the imagined collective future
affects the way of remembering the past (see de Saint Laurent, Obradovic, & Carriere, in press). In fact, the
role of collective memory – in this case, regarding conflicts – can be understood as a way of reconstructing the
past in light of different imagined futures in order to foster current actions, thus proleptically guiding the present
towards certain political goals (see the notion of prolepsis applied to collective memory in Brescó, 2017). From
this point of view, it can be argued that collective memory conveys a script with guidelines for action as well as
for interpreting the actions of other political actors involved in the conflict; a script that, in providing the story-line
of the conflict, not only describes what happened in the past and how is the state of things in the present, but it
also prescribes what lines of actions should be taken in the future. In making these scripts their own, individuals
run the risk of becoming trapped in certain positions in the conflict, thus becoming actors of a ready-made
story-line. This is usually the case whenever warring factions’ discourses saturate the public sphere, thus
making it difficult for alternative versions and voices to be articulated, let alone heard. In such cases, in the
absence of any alternative available discourse, the use of irony constitutes a way in which to resist the official
versions of the conflict. As we have seen in the previous section, the theatrical metaphor used by the third
participant in our study (Gray), is not only a resource to mock official and partisan versions of the truce period; it
also denotes a greater degree of agency through which that participant can denaturalize and distance himself
from those versions, thus gaining more authorship over his own way of recounting this episode.
Identity and memory are highly flammable elements whose misuse in certain contexts may make them ignite
into conflict. However, at the same time they can be important elements for an open and reflective citizenry.
Memory does not just keep hatreds alight. By looking at the past we can gain knowledge about our mistakes
and wrongdoings, victims can be remembered and compensated, and more reflective ways of dealing with
history can be promoted in order to avoid new conflicts in the future (Wagoner & Brescó, 2016). In the same
vein, the presence of different identities, far from being a threatening reality, constitutes an opportunity to
reconstruct the group’s inherited narratives about the past, which thus opens the door to rethinking and
generating more complex and flexible identities and positions that are open to change and diversity (Rosa &
González, 2012). History teaching, in this sense, is called upon to contribute to this endeavour by
denaturalizing historical narratives and encouraging the democratic participation of citizens in the public affairs
of plural societies (see Rosa & Brescó, 2017). In discussing the role of history teaching in an increasingly
globalized world, authors such as Rorty (1989) and Turner (2002) see irony as a way in which to foster a
sceptical attitude towards traditional national histories so that more open and cosmopolitan views can be
promoted (see Smith, 2007 for a discussion on this matter).
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Irony can indeed be a means by which to prevent individuals from naturalizing certain narratives transmitted
through the group, narratives which may hinder dialogue and reconciliation with others. In line with Egan’s
(1997) notion of ironic understanding regarding history teaching, Blanco and Rosa (1997) float the idea that
“perhaps it would not be a bad goal to look for an ironic citizenship, but an irony based upon reflection and
informed dialogue, not cynicism” (p. 15). Maybe irony is not enough, but it is probably a necessary element in
order to endow people with more agency so that they can gain perspective on identity, memory and conflicts.
Notes
i) Situated in the northeastern part of Spain, the Basque Country is an autonomous region with specific cultural features
(e.g., the Basque language). A great number of people in that region do not feel part of the Spanish nation and would like to
form and independent country. This scenario is strongly marked by the presence of the terrorist group ETA which started to
operate in 1969 (at the end of Franco’s dictatorship). Since then ETA has caused nearly 900 casualties, including
policemen, politicians, civilians, and military men. Over the last ten years, ETA has been losing strength in terms of both its
operational capacity and social support. In October 2011, the terrorist group announced the definitive termination of its
armed struggle. Nevertheless, the Basque conflict is still open and unresolved as ETA has not handed over its weapons.
ii) These actors are: 1) the Spanish Government, presided at that time by the Socialist party, who defended the legitimacy of
the peace-making process; 2) the terrorist group ETA and its political arm Batasuna, who advocates for the independence
of the Basque Country and legitimizes the use of violence; and 3) the right-wing People’s Party – the main group of the
Opposition at that time – who delegitimized the peace-process by accusing the socialist Government of making political
concessions to ETA in exchange for keeping the cease-fire.
iii) The selected sources were: El Mundo and ABC (centre-right wing newspapers, close to the People’s Party), El País
(centre-left wing newspaper, close to Zapatero’s Socialist Party), Gara (newspaper close to Batasuna – ETA’s political arm
–, and La Vanguardia (a Catalan centre-right newspaper). All political views on the Basque conflict were balanced across
sources.
iv) These two cases appear in Brescó (2009, 2016).
v) All participants have code names in order to preserve their anonymity.
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